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Abstract 
The costs of both legal education and legal services have been rising steadily for 
decades. This is because they share a common root: the constant above-inflation 
growth in the cost of labor-intensive goods and services known as the “cost 
disease.” The cost disease story roots cost growth not in market failure or 
bureaucratic waste, but in natural, even healthy, economic forces—productivity 
and wage growth. Because the source of this cost growth is productivity growth, 
the nature of the cost disease is such that an economy as a whole can afford 
these rising costs. But in a world of deep income inequality, the costs must be 
socialized, to be shared collectively. I argue here that the Income-Driven 
Repayment program for student loans is a mechanism for partially socializing 
the costs of both legal education and legal services, while still maintaining the 
vital independence of both law schools and the bar. I also take a critical look at 
the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program, counter-intuitively arguing that it 
has serious flaws in its goal of serving the broader public interest.  
I. Introduction 
An odd feature of the debate about the role of legal education in the United 
States is the simultaneous broad acceptance of the claim that we have too many 
law schools and too many law students,1 and also of the claim that our country 
has a severe problem with access to justice.2 The knee-jerk assumption that there 
are not enough jobs for law school graduates is belied by the fact that likely 
millions of citizens interact with the legal system—with both state and private 
                                               
1 See, e.g., Steven J. Harper, Too Many Law Students, Too Few Jobs, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2015). 
https://nyti.ms/1NyjHt5; Greg Toppo, Why You Might Want To Think Twice Before Going to Law 
School, USA TODAY (June 28, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/06/28/law-
schools-hunkering-down-enrollment-slips/430213001; Eric Posner, The Real Problem With Law 
Schools: Too Many Lawyers, SLATE (April 2, 2013), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2013/04/the_real_pr
oblem_with_law_schools_too_many_lawyers.html.  
2 See, e.g., LEGAL SVCS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL LEGAL 
NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS (2017), available at: https://www.lsc.gov/justicegap2017 
(finding that “86% of the civil legal problems reported by low-income Americans in the past 
year received inadequate or no legal help”).  
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parties—without adequate counsel and representation. We assume some 
number of law schools will have to close even as many individuals and families 
deal with some of the most important legal aspects of their lives, such as 
immigration, family, domestic violence, disability, veterans’ benefits, and 
housing issues, without adequate representation, or even any representation at 
all. Yes, many graduates of lower-ranked law schools struggle to find legal jobs, 
but if they walked into family court and asked who needs a lawyer, many hands 
would shoot up.  
What explains this disconnect? There is an unstated qualifier when we say 
that there are not enough law jobs. What is really meant is that there are not 
enough law jobs that could pay enough to make the investment in a law degree worthwhile. 
Here, I mean investment in the broadest sense, including the opportunity of 
cost of not choosing a different career. But for purposes of this article, I also 
mean in it the narrow sense of the monetary cost of a legal education. There are 
many steps that our country would have to take to make justice more available 
to more people, but one of them is to make legal education more affordable, so 
as to encourage more people to study law and join the bar. Another is to make 
legal services themselves more affordable, so that more people would be willing 
to get counsel when they need it.3 
But making both legal education and legal services more affordable is, as we 
have found, incredibly difficult. And this is not because of some broad systemic 
failure in these industries, but rather because of natural, even positive, economic 
forces. As labor-intensive services, both legal education and legal services are 
subject to an economic phenomenon known as “Baumol’s cost disease,” which 
observes that goods and services with no or low growth in labor productivity 
will see prices rise faster than inflation over time. The “disease” moniker 
underscores that the rising prices are troubling for these services, and also that 
                                               
3 For purposes of narrative simplicity, this article will generally refer to the lack of legal 
services in terms of direct representation in legal matters, such as cases in family or immigration 
court, or in administrative proceedings for government benefits. But the argument also extends 
to indirect services. For example, our public/private “hidden” welfare state depends heavily on 
privately run programs, such as employer-provided health care and retirement plans, 
unemployment insurance, tort liability, and labor and workplace protections, all of which at 
some level requires the administration of competent lawyers. See generally, e.g., JACOB HACKER, 
THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE BATTLE OVER PUBLIC AND SOCIAL BENEFITS IN THE 
UNITED STATES (2002); JENNIFER KLEIN, FOR ALL THESE RIGHTS: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND 
THE SHAPING OF AMERICA’S PUBLIC-PRIVATE WELFARE STATE (2003). Moreover, many of our 
public transfer programs are through the tax system, for example the earned income and child 
tax credits, the successful administration of which again necessitates a role for attorneys to help 
navigate the interaction between individuals and the state. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE 
HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 
(1997). And, given the increasing and unidirectional growth in the complexity of our world, 
these demands will only increase. See also John R. Brooks, Quasi-Public Spending, 104 GEO. L.J. 
1057 (2016). 
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they are caused by something deeper than, e.g., a misallocation of resources. But 
as I explain in more detail in Part III below, the causes of the disease are actually 
positive trends, namely economy-wide growth in productivity and wages. Quite 
simply, if the wages for those who work in legal education and legal services 
continue to rise, so will the prices of those services (barring the creation of some 
industry-disrupting technology). 
However, the silver lining of the cost disease is that it has a cure. That is, as 
long as the price growth in legal education and legal services is driven by 
increases in productivity elsewhere in the economy and in wages overall, the 
economy as a whole can also afford the price increases in the goods and services 
afflicted by the cost disease. But since the benefits of productivity and wage 
growth are not evenly distributed, managing the cost disease requires some 
socialization of the costs. There are, of course, any number of tools we could 
use to do this, but in the context of legal education, our primary tool for 
socializing these costs is the Income-Driven Repayment (“IDR”) program for 
federal student loans.  
From 2008 to 2015, through a series of statutory and regulatory changes, 
Congress and the Obama Administration dramatically reshaped the student loan 
system, and by extension our country’s system of higher education finance 
generally.4 By 2018, 90% of all student lending is directly from the federal 
government,5 and all of those loans (and most earlier loans) can, using one of 
the IDR programs, be paid back on an income-contingent basis, typically as 10% 
of discretionary income for 20 years, followed by forgiveness of the remaining 
loan balance. In effect, all higher education, including legal education, can be 
paid for by sharing a portion of one’s income with the federal government, 
much like we use the income tax to pay for other government-provided goods 
and services.  
IDR has quietly become a massively important part of higher education 
finance. As of the second quarter of 2018, $388.6 billion of student debt owed 
by nearly 7 million borrowers is in IDR—46% of all debt and 29% of all 
borrowers currently in repayment.6 And because of the way these rules are 
written, income-contingent loans are particularly important in funding law 
                                               
4 See John R. Brooks, The Case for More Debt: Expanding College Affordability By Expanding 
Income-Driven Repayment, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 847, 849-66 [hereinafter Case for More Debt] 
(discussing legislative and regulatory history); John R. Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment and the 
Public Financing of Higher Education, 104 GEO L.J. 229, 251-53 (2016) [hereinafter Income-Driven 
Repayment] (same) 
5 COLL. BD., TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2017 13 fig. 4 (2017), 
https://trends.collegeboard.org/student-aid (Total Federal and Nonfederal Loans in 2016 
Dollars, 1995–1996 to 2016–2017). 
6 Federal Student Aid, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Direct Loan Portfolio by Repayment Plan, 
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/student/portfolio.  
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school and other graduate and professional education. While an undergraduate 
can borrow at most $57,500 from the federal government (and typically closer 
to $27,000)7, a graduate or professional student can borrow up to the full cost 
of attendance.8 That amount is set by each school and includes costs of living; 
it can be nearly $100,000 per year for law school.9 
Because of the intimate connection between legal education and legal 
services, and the similar effects of the cost disease on each, this article calls for 
considering income-contingent student loans not just as a way to help 
individuals afford law school, but as at least part of a broader set of policies to 
increase access to justice in our country. This article proceeds as follows. Part II 
shows the rising costs of both legal education and legal services, and how they 
have followed similar paths. Part III roots this cost growth in the cost disease, 
and explains how the cost disease works and what its implications are, 
particularly for legal education and legal services. Part IV explains why managing 
the cost disease requires some socialization of the costs, i.e., spreading the costs 
widely across a society, and in progressive way. Part V argues that income-
contingent loans partially serve this role. This Part also takes a critical look at 
the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program, counter-intuitively arguing that it 
has serious flaws in its goal of serving the broader public interest. Part VI 
concludes.   
II. Rising Costs 
In this Part I briefly review some of the data regarding rising costs of both 
legal education and legal services. At least for the period of 1999 to 2013, for 
which we have the fullest data, the costs appear to have risen roughly the same 
amount, around 75% over that 15-year period. (An important exception is 
public law school tuition, about which more below.) This growth is significantly 
faster than overall inflation (CPI grew around 40% over that period), or even 
the inflation indexes that track higher education costs (which grew around 57% 
over that period). 
What follows is not intended as a rigorous statistical analysis, in part because 
it is difficult to get a truly accurate picture of the cost of legal education due to 
a lack of public data, and also because there will always be a number of 
confounding factors, not the least of which is that the United States faced two 
                                               
7 See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra note 62 and accompanying text. 
9 See, e.g., Columbia Law School, Costs and Budgeting: Standard Cost of Attendance, 
https://www.law.columbia.edu/financial-aid/costs-and-billing/costs-budgeting (2018-19 cost 
of attendance of $97,850); NYU Law School, Student Expense Budget, 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/financialaid/budgetandbudgeting/studentexpensebudget (2018-19 
cost of attendance of $96,845).  
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deep recessions during this 15-year period. Moreover, both legal education and 
legal services underwent significant structural changes during this time. What I 
want to illustrate is not so much rigorous numbers as broad trends, which I hope 
would be roughly the same in direction and magnitude regardless of particular 
statistical choices. 
A. The Rising Cost of Legal Education 
It is abundantly clear that nominal law school tuition and fees (i.e., listed 
tuition and fees before accounting for financial aid and other discounting)10 have 
been rising rapidly for decades. According to the American Bar Association, in-
state tuition for public law schools rose from $2,006 in 1985 to $23,879 in 2013, 
an increase of over 1000% over 29 years (an average annual growth rate of about 
9.3%).11 Private law school tuition and fees rose from $7,526 to $41,985, an 
increase of over 450% (6.35% per year).12 Over the 1999-2013 period, these 
growth rates were 8.62% and 5.18%, respectively. By contrast, inflation, as 
measured by the Consumer Price Index, has averaged more like 2.43% per year 
during that period.13 (Table 1 summarizes these and other growth rates.) 
But focusing only on schools’ posted gross tuition rates is a mistake, since 
schools have always discounted their tuition, based on both student need and 
merit. Moreover, school discounting appears to be increasing in recent years, 
slowing the overall growth rate in net tuition. Data is hard to come by, since 
schools are fairly tight with their proprietary data. The ABA published 
discounted net tuition data for public and private law schools for the years 1999, 
2004, 2009, and 2013, which show discount rates for public schools rising from 
19% to 30% and for private schools from 15% to 26%.14 
Figure 1 shows the growth of gross and net tuition over these periods (with 
a shorter period for net tuition, covering 1999-2013, the range of years that the 
ABA’s discounting information covers). To generate the chart, I simply assumed 
linear growth in discount rates between the years for which we have data. The 
chart shows that the growth rate for net tuition is slightly slower than the growth 
rate for gross tuition, with the rise in discount rates partially offsetting the more 
accelerated growth of gross tuition in recent years. Net tuition for public schools 
rises at an average growth rate of 7.65% and for private schools at 4.14% during 
                                               
10 For simplicity I just refer to “tuition” hereafter unless otherwise specified. 
11 American Bar Association, Law School Tuition, available at: 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/statistics.html.  
12 Id. 
13 Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI-All Urban Consumers (Current Series), available at: 
https://www.bls.gov/cpi.  
14 Author’s calculations based on AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON THE 
FINANCING OF LEGAL EDUCATION, Report 22-30, figs. 4a, 4b, 5a, 5c, available at: 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/committees/aba-task-force-on-the-
financing-of-legal-education-.html.  
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this period. The rates are still high, but materially slower than that the 8.62% 
and 5.18% rates for gross tuition.  
The faster rise of public law school tuition (net and gross) deserves some 
further discussion. As we will see below, private school net tuition tracks more 
closely with the growth rate for legal services. But public law school tuition, even 
net of a generous average 30% discount rate, has risen at a substantially higher 
rate. (Figure 2, which is scaled to have 1999=100 shows clearly how much public 
net tuition growth is an outlier compared to the growth in other costs.) The 
causes of cost growth in legal education, and in higher education in general, are 
heavily debated, but one cause that seems fairly certain for public schools is the 
decline in direct state government funding for higher education.15 This is 
particularly true for law schools, many of which have become essentially private 
institutions, with barely any government support at all. This confounds the data, 
since nominal tuition data not only reflects increases in the total cost of 
providing legal education, but also a shift in the source of payments, from state 
governments to students. Since private law schools never had state funding to 
lose, their tuition growth likely tracks more closely to overall cost growth than 
public school tuition does.  
B. Rising Cost of Legal Services 
The rising cost of legal services receives much less attention (at least among 
law professors) than the rising cost of legal education, but it is still a very real, 
and important phenomenon. But it also more difficult to track, because of the 
diffusion of legal service providers, and of those who pay for legal services. 
Purchasers of legal services include everyone from corporations paying over 
$1000 per hour for white shoe New York firms to local governments paying 
court-appointed attorneys, and even to in-house counsel.  
Since I am more interested in growth rates than absolute costs, I am using 
the data from the Producer Price Index published by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.16 The BLS data only goes back to 1997, but there appears to be a 
methodological change in 1999, so I just look at the index from 1999 to 2013. 
Over this period, the PPI index for legal services grew at an average annual 
                                               
15 See, e.g., Douglas A. Webber, State Disinvestment and Tuition at Public Institutions, 66 ECON. 
ED. REV. 1, 3 (2017) (finding that has much of 41.2% of public tuition increases is due to state 
disinvestment); Sandy Baum et al., Tuition and State Appropriations: Using Evidence and Logic to Gain 
Perspective, Urban Institute Report (2018) (summarizing research). 
16 Even if one might have doubts about the components of the index (something I do not 
have the expertise to judge), my hope is that any errors are at least consistent over time, so that 
growth in the index is still reflective of the growth in overall costs. 
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growth rate of 3.94%.17 As with legal education, this is a significantly faster than 
the growth in overall consumer prices, which averaged 2.43% over the period.18 
C. Comparing Cost Growth in Legal Education and Legal 
Services 
Figure 2 shows the relative increases in net tuition for public and private law 
schools and for legal services, alongside the increases in CPI and two measures 
of inflation in higher education, the Higher Education Price Index (“HEPI”)19 
and the Higher Education Cost Adjustment (“HECA”),20 for the period 1999-
2013 and all scaled so that 1999=100 for all the cost measures.  
As noted above, public law school net tuition is a clear outlier, in part 
because it reflects not just rising costs but also cuts in direct state government 
funding. But looking at the other measures shows higher education costs in 
general rising about one-and-a-half times faster than overall prices and both 
private law school net tuition and legal services rising at about twice the rate of 
inflation.  
The key take-away here is the very similar growth trajectory of the cost of 
legal education and the cost of legal services. I discuss in the next section why it 
is not surprising, and even expected, for the costs of these two services to rise 
at similar rates. But we should also understand that if we think the rising cost of 
legal education is a crisis, then the very same logic applies to legal services as 
well. And because of the intimate connection between these two services, we 
should think about common solutions.  
 
Table 1: Average Annual Growth Rates, 1999-2013 
Public school, in-state listed (gross) tuition 8.8% 
Private school listed tuition 5.18% 
Public school net tuition 7.65% 
Private school net tuition 4.14% 
PPI for legal services 3.99% 
Professor compensation (salary & benefits)* 3.81% 
                                               
17 Bureau of Labor Statistics, PPI Industry Group Data for Legal Services, available at: 
https://www.bls.gov/ppi/data.htm.  
18 See BLS, infra note 13. This is slightly slower rate that noted at note 13 because I am 
looking at the 1999-2017 period.  
19 Commonfund Institute, Commonfund Higher Education Price Index, 2016 Update 3, 
tbl. a, available at: https://www.commonfund.org/commonfund-institute/higher-education-
price-index-hepi.  
20 State Higher Education Executive Officers Assn., The Higher Education Cost 
Adjustment: A Proposed Tool for Assessing Inflation in Higher Education Costs 3, tbl. 1 (2017), 
available at: http://www.sheeo.org/projects/shef/learn_more.  
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Lawyer salaries (salary only) 2.81% 
HEPI/HECA 3.31% 
CPI-U 2.43% 
* 1997-2011  
Sources cited in text  
 
III. Understanding the Cost Disease 
While there are likely many and varied reasons for the rising costs of both 
legal education and legal services, a likely cause of at least some of that rise is 
simply that both are labor-intensive services, which in general see costs rise 
faster than inflation—an economic phenomenon often called “Baumol’s cost 
disease.”21 The cost disease helps to explain the ever-increasing costs of a 
number of goods and services in the economy, including health care, education, 
and government services like policing, firefighting, and social services.  
I explain the cost disease briefly below, but at the outset it is worth noting 
that calling it a “disease” is a misnomer, as we will see. It is fundamentally a 
product of healthy economic forces, and furthermore cost increases caused by 
the cost disease are affordable by definition. The cost disease raises difficult 
public policy challenges, but it is ultimately a political, not economic, problem.22 
The essence of the cost disease is that as wages rise over time, industries that 
are not able easily to increase the productivity of their workers will see their 
prices rise along with wages. The clearest example is the one used by William 
Baumol and William Bowen in their first paper on the subject: live performing 
arts.23 It takes the same number of actors the same amount of time to perform 
Henry IV Part I today as it did in 1600—the labor productivity of live theater 
actors and live musicians has barely budged in 400 years. Yet actors and 
musicians do not expect to earn 1600-era wages (even in real terms), since costs 
and standards of living are much higher today. 
                                               
21 See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE COST DISEASE: WHY COMPUTER GET CHEAPER AND 
HEALTH CARE DOESN’T (2012).  
22 I am not saying that all cost increases are healthy or appropriate. Cost increases driven 
by, e.g., mismanagement, rent-seeking, supply or demand shortages, etc., are real problems. I am 
just making the narrower point that cost increases as a result only of the cost disease are not inherently 
an economic problem, even if they can be a political or public choice problem. See William J. 
Baumol, Health Care, Education and the Cost Disease: A Looming Crisis for Public Choice, 77 PUB. 
CHOICE 17 (1993). 
23 William J. Baumol & William G. Bowen, On the Performing Arts: The Anatomy of Their 
Economic Problems, 55 AMER. ECON. REV. 495 (1965). 
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The story gets a bit more complex when considering the source of wage 
growth. There is of course a lot that goes into the determination of wages, 
including the relative bargaining power of labor and capital. But the ability for 
firms to pay higher wages comes largely from improvements in labor 
productivity due to the investment of capital and from innovations and 
inventions. The capital and innovations let a given worker produce more 
output—through the use of tools, machines, technology, etc. At least some of 
that increased output will go to the worker in the form of higher wages.24  
But these wage increases do not only affect workers in these high–labor 
productivity industries. Upward pressure on wages in the high-productivity 
sectors cause wages to rise in low-productivity sectors as well, since all sectors 
have to draw from the same labor market.25 But the low-productivity sectors do 
not have the same increase in output per worker. If their labor costs go up, the 
prices for the goods and services have to go up as well. In contrast, high-
productivity sectors can often pay higher wages even as real prices for their 
goods and services fall. 
Returning to the performing arts example, we can also see how innovation 
and productivity can counteract the cost disease. Inventions like audio and video 
recording, radio, movies, TV, and the Internet have made the creation and 
distribution of entertainment vastly more cost effective, so that a given 
performance can now reach millions of people at an affordable price. But this 
underscores the point that the key is technological innovation—for industries 
like education where technology is lacking, the cost disease continues to be 
dominant. Moreover, it also highlights that the innovation in question often 
involves substitution—e.g., switching from live to recorded performances. 
These are not necessarily equivalent products, and as long as there remains a 
demand for live performance (or live classroom teaching), the cost disease will 
continue to play a role.  
A. Cost Disease in Legal Education 
After live performing arts, education is perhaps the industry that best fits 
the cost disease story.26 A given teacher or professor has a pretty hard upward 
bound on the number of students that he or she can teach—there is only so 
                                               
24 This is not to say that productivity necessarily leads to wage growth, and there is evidence 
that in recent decades much of the growth in output from labor productivity has accrued to 
owners of capital. See, e.g., Economic Policy Institute, The Productivity-Pay Gap, 
https://www.epi.org/productivity-pay-gap.  But it remains the case that for there to be any real 
wage growth over time, labor productivity has to increase. 
25 See ROBERT B. ARCHIBALD & DAVID H. FELDMAN, WHY DOES COLLEGE COST SO 
MUCH? 36–37 (2011); BAUMOL, supra note 21, at 21 (“In the long run, wages for all workers 
throughout a country’s economy tend to go up and down together.”). 
26 See Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment, supra note 4, 239-42; see generally ARCHIBALD & 
FELDMAN, supra note 25. 
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much time to grade papers and tests, and only so much room in a classroom or 
lecture hall. But teachers and professors still expect their wages to rise over time, 
and if those wages rise faster than inflation, then so will the costs of education 
generally. 
To be sure, professors’ salaries are not the only sources of cost increases in 
higher education. As schools have started providing a broader range of services, 
administrative and capital expenses have also risen. And, as in every industry, 
there is also likely a degree of waste and rent-seeking. But classes taught or led 
by professors remain the central product of higher education. According to 
Education Department data, total compensation (salary plus benefits)27 for 
professors grew at around 3.8% a year between 1998 and 2011.28 Good data on 
law professors specifically is hard to come by, but we can probably assume that 
law professors’ salaries grew at a similar rate. This falls a bit short of the 4.14% 
average growth rate for private school net tuition, but is in the same ballpark, 
and substantially more than average CPI of around 2%.  
It is worth noting that there are—of course—productivity improvements in 
higher education. For undergraduate education, the main ways that schools have 
tried to improve productivity are using cheaper labor, like graduate students and 
adjunct professors, and online courses. Neither of these have significantly 
broken through to law schools, but even if they do at some point, it is not clear 
at all that they would have the sort of productivity improvements that could 
substantially slow or reverse cost increases.29 For one thing, they still rely heavily 
on labor. Even online courses still need graders, discussion leaders, and so on, 
and these workers would expect raises. Moreover, these interventions likely have 
a negative effect on quality, and delivering a lower-quality product at the same 
price is just as inflationary as delivering the same quality at a higher price. There 
will likely always be a demand for full-time professors teaching live in a 
classroom, and that product will remain expensive. 
But even allowing for all the technological interventions that have improved 
teaching and research productivity—like digital research and communication, 
online course management, and computer technology in general—does not 
                                               
27 It is important to include the value of benefits since it is an increasingly important portion 
of overall compensation and because it has been rising faster than cash wages. See infra notes 35-
36 and accompanying text.  
28 To calculate this I used salary data for full professors and average benefits per full-time 
faculty member, since NCES data did not separate benefits out by academic rank. I used full 
professor salary on the assumption that law schools generally rely on tenured faculty whose 
salaries are at the top end of overall faculty salaries. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ., Digest of Educ. Statistics, tbls. 316.10 & 316.70 (2017), available at: 
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/current_tables.asp.  
29 For a fuller discussion of this point, see Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment, supra note 4, at 
242-44.  
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counter the cost disease story. The cost disease requires only low productivity 
growth, not none at all. As long as productivity lacks behind wage growth, costs 
will continue to rise faster than inflation. Even the most techno-optimist visions 
of online or AI-driven education are unlikely to match the exponential growth 
in labor productivity we have seen in, say, agriculture, an industry which has 
gone from employing the majority of all workers in 187030 to virtually no one 
today,31 even while increasing output to enormous levels.  
B. Cost Disease in Legal Services 
The same basic story applies in legal services: a fundamentally labor-
intensive exercise that has seen some technological innovations that improve 
productivity on the margin, but not on nearly the scale that would be required 
to slow or reverse real cost growth. Beyond the general labor-saving 
technologies, like email and word processing, innovations like online legal 
databases and text-analyzing discovery software have shortened the amount of 
time lawyers and other legal workers spend on these tasks. And we are told that 
an AI-driven future without lawyers is just around the corner. But the bedrock 
service provided by attorneys—representation in court and other legal 
proceedings—remains as labor-intensive as ever, and no conceivable technology 
can replace it. As with legal education, attempts to save money—e.g., by pushing 
people into arbitration or settlement, using do-it-yourself online services, or 
simply appearing pro se—likely mean a lower-quality product, and so do not 
actually address inflationary pressures. 
While the Producer Price Index for legal services rose an average of 3.76% 
between 1999 and 2017,32 hourly lawyer wages grew at an average rate of 2.59% 
over that period, according to BLS data.33 But this data comes from the 
Occupational Employment Statistics survey, which does not include benefits, 
such as health care and retirement plan contributions.34 BLS data from the 
National Compensation Survey shows that the benefits portion of total 
compensation for all civilian workers has been rising at a rate of around 3.4% in 
                                               
30 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL 
TIMES TO 1970 138 (1975). 
31 See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment by Major Industry Sector, 
https://www.bls.gov/emp/tables/employment-by-major-industry-sector.htm (showing 
roughly 1.5% of the labor force employed in agriculture in 2016). 
32 See supra note 17. 
33 Author’s calculations from Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Employment 
Statistics, https://www.bls.gov/oes/tables.htm.  
34 See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Employment Statistics, Frequently Asked 
Questions, https://www.bls.gov/oes/oes_ques.htm.  
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recent years,35 compared to 2.4% for wages and salaries.36 Extrapolating, we can 
probably assume that overall lawyer compensation grew at closer to 3.6%, very 
close to the growth rate in the cost of legal services.  
IV. Curing the Cost Disease 
The previous section argued that the cost disease may help to explain the 
rising costs of both legal education and legal services, since both are labor-
intensive industries not well-suited to the productivity-enhancing technologies 
that have flourished in some other industries. And the compensation data for 
law professors and for lawyers also fits reasonably well with that story, with both 
rising materially faster than overall inflation, and fairly close to the rise in costs 
for legal education and legal services, respectively, especially when total 
compensation is considered.37 
So far, this story sounds truly bleak—costs for necessary services rising ever-
faster, with little that we can do to stop it other than suppressing wage growth 
or substituting into inferior products or services—more MOOCs and 
mandatory arbitrations, more adjunct professors and online legal forms. But 
labeling this phenomenon a “disease” is actually too negative, since it is a 
product of positive economic forces—productivity and wage growth. 
Moreover, those same forces can end up curing the cost disease. The same 
productivity improvements that drive wage growth also create the savings 
needed to pay for that cost growth—that is, an economy as a whole will always 
be able to afford cost increases due to the cost disease. The catch is that income 
and wealth inequality make it such that a given individual may not be able to afford 
the cost increases. Ultimately, the cost disease ends up being a distributional 
issue that requires us to make difficult choices about whether to limit goods like 
legal education and legal services only to those with the most resources, or 
whether to socialize and share some of the costs.   
                                               
35 Author’s calculations based on Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employer Costs For Employee 
Compensation, All Civilian Total Benefits for All Occupations, Cost per Hour, 2004-2018, 
available at: https://www.bls.gov/data. 
36 Author’s calculations based on Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employer Costs For Employee 
Compensation, All Civilian Wages and Salaries for All Occupations, Cost per Hour, 2004-2018, 
available at: https://www.bls.gov/data. 
37 It should be noted that professors and lawyers are far from the only people employed in 
legal education and legal services. But the same general argument applies, since the industries in 
general are labor intensive—there is not a ton of room for massive productivity improvement 
among administrative and support employees at law schools, for example.) 
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A. Enough Money in the Economy 
Before turning to the distributional implications of the cost disease, we 
should understand that rising costs as a result of productivity and wage growth 
are affordable to the economy as a whole. Recall that the driver of wage growth 
in this story is rising labor productivity in some sectors of the economy. A given 
worker, using capital and technological innovation, can produce more output 
per hour of work, and at least some of that comes back to the worker in the 
form of higher wages. But those same productivity improvements can also drive 
down real prices for the goods being produced or otherwise free up economic 
resources. In essence, the money we save on lower prices for toasters and 
televisions can be used to pay the higher prices for education and legal services 
(and health care and other cost disease-afflicted goods and services).38 The 
overall bundle of goods does not need to change much at all, even if the 
allocation of money within the bundle changes a lot. 
Another way to think about it is that if cost-disease price increases mostly 
track labor compensation growth—as they do for legal education and legal 
services—then, on average, people can pay the rising costs out of their rising 
labor incomes. If for some reason productivity slows such that wage growth 
slows as well, then that also slows the upward pressure on the costs of labor-
intensive services, keeping the services affordable on average. 
Now, this is quite obviously a vastly over-simplified story. Three issues in 
particular make addressing the cost disease much more challenging. First, 
capital’s share of income appears to be rising, in part because capital is taking a 
bigger share of the gains from productivity improvements than economic theory 
suggests should happen in a competitive labor market.39 Some suggest this is 
because of monopsony conditions among employers,40 the decline of labor 
unions,41 and other factors that limit the bargaining power of labor.42 But why it 
is happening is beyond the scope of this article; I only observe that labor may 
be capturing less of the rewards of productivity gains in the form of wages than 
                                               
38 See BAUMOL, supra note 21, 43-58. 
39 See, e.g., Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Labor Share of Output Has 
Declined Since 1947 (March 7, 2017), available at: https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2017/labor-
share-of-output-has-declined-since-1947.htm; Economic Policy Institute, The Productivity-Pay 
Gap (August 2018), https://www.epi.org/productivity-pay-gap.  
40 See, e.g., Suresh Naidu, Eric Posner & Glen Weyl, More and More Companies Have Monopoly 
Power Over Workers’ Wages. That’s Killing the Economy, VOX (April 6, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/4/6/17204808/wages-employers-workers-
monopsony-growth-stagnation-inequality.  
41 See, e.g., Karl Russell, Ben Casselman, Patricia Cohen, Conor Dougherty & Noam 
Scheiber, 6 Reasons That Pay Has Lagged Behind U.S. Job Growth, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1 2018, available 
at: https://nyti.ms/2FAKPGO.  
42 See, e.g., id.  
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we might hope. This may not necessarily be a problem for the cost disease, 
however, since limited wage growth could also limit price increases in labor-
intensive services. But the next point challenges that. 
Second, growing inequality, even just in labor income, makes the effects of 
cost growth different depending on where one is in the income distribution. 
Professionals and those with college degrees have seen decent wage growth, 
while worker- and middle-class worker have not.43 So looking only at average 
wage growth masks important distributional differences. Those most struggling 
to keep up with cost disease-driven inflation in health care and education are 
also those who are receiving the least gains from productivity-driven wage 
growth. At the same time, as we have seen, the wages of those who work in legal 
education (and higher education generally) and legal services have risen, driving 
the costs of those services higher.44 In other words, the divergence in wage 
growth between professionals and those with college degrees versus others is 
not only a driver of inequality in its own right, but also drives further inequality 
in the ability to afford goods and services affected by the cost disease. 
Third, as noted above, much of the growth in total labor compensation has 
gone to benefits, especially employer-provided health insurance.45 So even 
where labor has captured some of the gains from productivity improvements, 
those gains have largely gone to pay the rising cost of health care, another service 
afflicted by the cost disease. Health care is a complicated issue that is (thankfully) 
beyond the scope of this article, but even if we make the heroic assumption that 
all of the cost increases in health care are only because of the cost disease (in 
which case they would not necessarily by a bad thing), the fact that health care 
is generally paid up-front by employers or through paycheck withholding means 
that it may partly crowd out other goods and services with rising costs, particular 
for those with slow or flat wage growth. As evidenced by the slower growth in 
cash wages, health care’s first bite at the apple leaves less for other goods and 
services  
The challenge, therefore, is that while the cost disease story tells us that there 
ought to be enough resources in an economy to afford rising prices in low–labor 
productivity growth industries like legal education and legal services, the 
                                               
43 See, e.g., Elise Gould, Looking at the Latest Wage Data by Education Level, Economic Policy 
Institute Blog (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.epi.org/blog/looking-at-the-latest-wage-data-by-
education-level.  
44 See supra notes 28 and 33 and accompanying text; Jay Shambaugh & Ryan Nunn, Why 
Wages Aren’t Growing in America, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 24, 2017), available at: 
https://hbr.org/2017/10/why-wages-arent-growing-in-america (noting distribution 
differences in wage growth). 
45 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text; Anna Stansbury & Lawrence Summers, 
Productivity and Pay: Is the Link Broken?, NBER Working Paper No. 24165, at 8-9 & n.7 (2017). 
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distribution of those resources among individuals and households can still make 
some goods and services unaffordable for large swaths of society. Ultimately, 
the cost disease is not an issue of economic efficiency but rather of equity and 
fairness. 
B. Socializing the Costs 
A first-best solution to the distributional issues created by the cost disease 
is to improve distribution, i.e., to generate policies that drive wage growth, 
especially in the lower ends of the income distribution.46 Barring that, the other 
choices available are 1) top-down cost controls,47 2) accepting rationing by 
income, or 3) some socializing of the costs. In my view, the first is unacceptable 
for economic reasons and the second for justice and fairness reasons, which 
means we are left with trying to figure out some way to spread the costs across 
society, to bear them collectively and progressively.  
In the context of legal education and legal services, what would this entail? 
The most basic tool for socializing a good or service in this way is government 
itself. From a public finance perspective, government is just a group of people 
coming together to collectively acquire goods and services that the private 
market cannot provide well or at all.48 Government can get around the collective 
action, asymmetrical information, and intergenerational problems that can lead 
to market failure, and it can also provide a mechanism—progressive taxation—
for paying for goods in a way that is affordable for everyone. If we believe, as I 
have argued here, that we are under-providing legal services, and therefore also 
under-providing legal education, in part because of cost pressures that are largely 
a function of income and wealth inequality, then perhaps government should 
step in and provide these services directly. All law schools become direct-funded 
public institutions and all legal services are government provided, with 
progressive taxes used to pay the associated costs. 
Needless to say, there would be a number of problems with this approach. 
First, the politics of raising taxes and expanding the public sector to that degree 
                                               
46 The growth would have to be significant, since we would need wages to catch up to where 
they should be to match the growth that has occurred in education and higher education, plus 
continue to grow along with those costs going forward. This could have the potential to increase 
cost disease pressures, since presumably at least some of those higher wages would be paid to 
individuals working in low-productivity industries, driving prices in those industries higher.  
47 Recall that by assumption I am addressing cost increases due to the cost disease, i.e., due 
to market-driven wage growth in low–productivity growth industries. To the degree that there 
are other factors affecting costs, like waste, rent-seeking, or monopoly, other policy tools should 
be considered. 
48 For an articulation of this “public finance” view of government, and the competing 
“public choice” view, see generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC 
FINANCE AND PUBLIC CHOICE: TWO CONTRASTING VISIONS OF THE STATE (1999). 
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are challenging, to say the least. Second, the services would be provided 
regardless of ability to pay, which could end up being a regressive transfer, or at 
least more generous to higher-income individuals than necessary, since many of 
those individuals are inframarginal.49 Third, and probably most importantly, it 
would severely impact that independence of both the academy and the bar, two 
professions that thrive on freedom from unnecessary government intrusion. For 
the bar in particular, much of its most important work is challenging unlawful 
government action; that role could be threatened if every lawyer were an 
employee of the government. 
These are simplistic objections to a simplistic proposal. More sophisticated 
proposals might generate different responses, but it is not my purposes here to 
unpack all the possible forms of government funding for these services. Instead, 
I want to argue that income-contingent loans, as currently embodied in the 
Education Department’s Income-Driven Repayment programs, provide at least 
a partial pathway to progressive public funding, while avoiding some of the 
worst objections above. 
V. The Partial Solution of IDR and PSLF 
The problem as laid out so far is the following: Legal services are a vital and 
necessary service in our democracy, particular in an era of large government and 
complex regulation. But our country is far short of meeting the demand for legal 
services, in part because of the high costs of the labor-intensive service of 
lawyering. Producing lawyers is also expensive, which in turns exacerbates the 
cost pressures on legal services, since lawyers may feel the need to recoup the 
significant private investment they have made in their human capital, while many 
schools cannot feasibly charge lower their prices. Providing sufficient direct 
funding to fund both legal services and legal education would be politically and 
fiscally challenging, and furthermore could undermine the vital independence of 
both the academy and the bar. 
I argue in this Part that income-contingent loans can provide a solution to 
this problem, even if only a partial and imperfect one. They are not the only 
solution of course (as this journal issue makes clear), but since they are a policy 
tool already in place, we should begin to see them not just as a narrow tool to 
help law and other students afford their student loans, but rather as a broader 
mechanism to secure sufficient, progressive funding to pay not only or legal 
education, but legal services in general.  
                                               
49 See John Brooks, Brian Galle & Brendan Maher, Cross-Subsidies: Government’s Hidden 
Pocketbook, 106 GEO. L.J. 1229, 1261-66 (discussing the issue and summarizing research). 
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In this Part, I first lay out some of the details of the loan programs. They are 
complex, and I omit some of the fine print here in service of the larger 
conceptual and policy argument. (I refer interested readers to some of my other 
work to understand the programs in more detail.50) I then explain why these 
loans can serve as a progressive funding mechanism for legal education and, by 
extension, legal services. Finally, I take a closer look at the Public Service Loan 
Forgiveness program in particular and why despite good intentions it does not 
fit well into this broader conception of the role of income-contingent loans. 
A. Income-Driven Repayment Programs 
The Education Department has several different programs under the 
heading of Income-Driven Repayment: Income-Based Repayment (IBR), Pay 
As You Earn (PAYE), and Revised Pay As You Earn (REPAYE).51 IBR actually 
come in two forms, depending on the type and vintage of the loan. And there is 
also an early, less generous program, Income-Contingent Repayment (ICR), that 
started in the 1990s, but never had much adoption. Finally, Public Service Loan 
Forgiveness (PSLF) can also apply to any loan.  
This alphabet soup of programs makes summarizing the program details 
difficult, and mostly beyond the scope of this paper. For our purposes, we can 
generalize somewhat. First, the programs allow borrowers to make monthly loan 
payments that are no more than (usually) 10% of “discretionary income,” where 
discretionary income is (usually) the borrower’s adjusted gross income minus 
150% of the relevant poverty threshold.52 After 20-25 years (or 10 years for 
those in PSLF53) any remaining loan balance is forgiven.54 The programs differ 
most substantially in their rules for interest accrual and capitalization, which can 
make an enormous difference over the life of the loan, even though the rules 
may not always be clear to borrowers ex ante.55 
Two other differences in the programs are worth mention. First, in all of the 
programs except for REPAYE, a borrower pays the lesser of 10% of 
                                               
50 See Brooks, The Case for More Debt, supra note 4; Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment, supra note 
4. 
51 See Brooks, Case for More Debt, supra note 4 at 849-56. for a review of the major features 
of each program; see also Federal Student Aid, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Income-Driven Plans, 
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/understand/plans/income-driven.  
52 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.209(a)(2)(i) (PAYE), 685.209(c)(2)(i) (REPAYE), and 685.221(b)(1) 
(IBR). 
53 34 C.F.R. § 685.219(c)(1). 
54 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.209(a)(6)(i) (PAYE), 685.209(c)(5)(ii)(A) (REPAYE), and 685.221(f)(1) 
(IBR). 
55 See Brooks, Case for More Debt, supra note 4, at 849-56 (reviewing and comparing interest 
rules). 
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discretionary income or the standard loan repayment amount.56 So when a 
borrower’s income gets high enough, she reverts to a typical flat loan service 
schedule. For REPAYE, by contrast, the borrower continues to pay 10% of 
discretionary income no matter what her income.57 Second, for borrowers not 
in PSLF, the forgiveness of the debt may create gross income for tax purposes, 
meaning that in practice the full amount of the loan is not really forgiven.58 For 
PSLF, by contrast, the tax code explicitly excludes the amount of canceled debt 
from gross income.59 
B. IDR is Progressive Public Funding of Legal Education  
The brief sketch of the programs above reveals that the IDR programs can 
be thought of as a sort of income surtax to pay for higher education.60 The 
government provides the funds for tuition up front, and finances that payment 
by collecting a percentage of a graduate’s income—that is not so far off from 
the way the government funds its other programs, goods, and services largely 
through the personal income tax. Of course, there are vast differences between 
the student loan program and the tax system, especially the facts that future 
collections from loan borrowers are classified as a “debt,” whereas future tax 
payments are not, and that the loan repayments end after a period whereas tax 
obligations do not. But at a high level of generality, income-contingent loans 
from the government are more analogous to tax payments than they are to, say, 
standard commercial loans. 
If that is so, then IDR provides a form of progressive funding for higher 
education not so different from, say, free tuition paid for with higher income 
taxes. And this is particularly true for law schools, and other graduate and 
professional schools. IDR essentially only applies to federal Direct Loans to 
students, and Direct Loans to undergraduates are capped at fairly low 
amounts—a total of $27,000 for a four-year student who is still a dependent of 
his or her parents,61 and a maximum of $57,500 for an independent student with 
                                               
56 See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(4)(i)(A), (a borrower in PAYE pays no more than what 
the standard loan payment would be, even if the income-contingent payment would be higher).  
57 The REPAYE regulations do not include a provision similar to 34 C.F.R. § 
685.209(a)(4)(i), supra. See Student Assistance General Provisions, Federal Family Education 
Loan Program, and William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 80 Fed. Reg. 39,608, 39,618 
(July 9, 2015) (explaining this aspect of REPAYE).  
58 While this appears to be the accepted view, I think it is wrong as a matter of policy, and 
is also based on a mis-application of legal precedents. See John R. Brooks, Treasury Should Exclude 
Income From Discharge of Student Loans, 152 TAX NOTES 751 (Aug. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Student 
Loan Discharge]. 
59 I.R.C. § 108(f). 
60 For expanded arguments on this point see John R. Brooks, Student Loans as Taxes, 151 
TAX NOTES 513 (Apr. 25, 2016); Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment, supra note 4, at 258-63. 
61 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1078(b), 1078-8(d)(3). 
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more than four years of schooling.62 But as of this writing, graduate and 
professional students can borrow up to the full cost of attendance,63 an amount 
which includes not just tuition and fees, but also the student’s expected cost of 
living.64 In other words, it is not impossible for a law school to have its entire 
tuition revenue come from IDR-eligible loans and for all of those loans to be 
paid back as a percentage of the graduate’s income. In that case, the federal 
government would essentially be taxing the law school’s graduates to cover the 
costs of running the school.65 
This form of funding should be contrasted with other potential policies to 
pay for legal education, including direct government funding of schools and 
direct grants to students. These are already part of the mix of revenue sources 
used to pay for higher education (along with charitable contributions), so the 
question is whether direct funding should be relied on more heavily in place of 
using tuition funding by income-contingent loans. As noted above, the political 
challenges of direct funding are steep. But it is also debatable whether direct 
funding would even be desirable.  
Direct funding of schools at the levels needed to make up for tuition revenue 
has the potential to be regressive, since the benefits would accrue to all students, 
not just those most in need. It would be much more expensive to lower tuitions 
for everyone than to lower them only for those who cannot afford current 
tuition levels. Furthermore, much of that money would be wasted on 
inframarginal consumers, those who do not need additional subsidies to change 
their behavior.66 
Similarly, more generous grants to students, while better targeted to those 
who have greater need ex ante, do little to help those who may struggle after 
graduation. A law student from a poor family may go on to be a big firm law 
partner, and it is fair and equitable to ask that person to pay for the full cost of 
their education, rather than ask taxpayers to support her. Income-contingent 
                                               
62 See 20 U.S.C. § 1078-8(d)(4)(B). 
63 Direct Loan limits for graduate and professional students are higher than for 
undergraduates. 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.203(b)(2)(iii), (c)(2) (2018) (annual limit of $20,500); id. at § 
685.203(e)(3) (lifetime limit of $138,500). But graduate and professional students can also take 
out Grad PLUS loans up to the full cost of attendance, see 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.203(f), (g), and those 
loans are also eligible for IDR, see, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(ii) (excepting from IDR only Direct 
PLUS Loans made to parent borrowers, but not to student borrowers).  
64 20 U.S.C. § 1087ll. 
65 More precisely, it would be taxing the pool of all consumers of higher education to pay 
for all higher education. 
66 See Brooks et al., supra note 49, at 1261-66, and accompanying text. 
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loans target their benefits to those who have the fewest monetary rewards from 
their education, paid for by those with the most.67 
C. IDR Can Be Progressive Public Funding of Legal 
Services 
An argument of this article is that the need for legal services cannot be met 
with the current supply of lawyers, and this is in part because the cost disease 
has pushed the costs of legal services out of reach of those who have not seen 
sufficient wage gains over time, particularly after accounting for the rising costs 
of other cost disease–afflicted services, especially health care.68 In essence, what 
a large segment of the population is able or willing to pay is not sufficient to pay 
the costs and meet the wage expectations of a professional with an expensive 
advanced degree. The implication of this is that to expand the supply of legal 
services requires at least some socialization of the costs, just as we have partially 
socialized the costs of health care and higher education. 
To be clear, we already do some amount of socialization for legal services. 
Public defenders and legal aid corporations, for example, provide much needed 
services to the low-income clients, subsidized by government and private grants. 
But these do not come close to meeting the needs of clients dealing with family, 
immigration, disability, housing, or other civil matters where representation is 
not guaranteed, to say nothing of the often inadequate representation in criminal 
proceedings.69 Moreover, this legal work is partially subsidized by the lawyers 
themselves in the form of lower wages. Government and public interest law jobs 
generally pay lower salaries than law firms or private practice, and lawyers in 
private practice that serve low- and middle-income individuals and families make 
lower salaries than those serving businesses and high net worth individuals and 
families. This can be seen in part by the well-known bi-modal distribution of 
starting salaries for lawyers. According to NALP, the average starting salary for 
the class of 2016 is around $90,000 but half of all law graduates actually start 
with an income under $65,000.70 The average is skewed because of a cluster of 
                                               
67 See Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment, supra note 4, at 268-72. 
68 Another cost that has grown faster than inflation for many households is the cost of 
housing. The cost of housing is related to the cost disease, in the sense that construction is labor 
intensive and has limited opportunities for technological innovation to drive prices down. But 
market prices seem to be driven much more by scarcity than these more structural reasons, 
particular in desirable locations like New York City and other major cities. Some zoning rules 
also have the effect of limiting productivity, since they can impede the ability to build multiple 
housing units in a single building on a single parcel. 
69 See LEGAL SVCS. CORP., supra note 2 
70 See, e.g., Judith N. Collins, Jobs & JDs: Employment for the Class of 2016—Selected 
Findings, Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, at 2-3, available at: 
https://www.nalp.org/uploads/SelectedFindingsClassof2016.pdf.  
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around 16% of law graduates who start out in large firms with starting salaries 
of $180,000 or more.71 
Expanding legal services further into under-served areas may require some 
degree of public or collective funding, but whether or not that is the case, it will 
almost certainly require attorneys to continue to accept lower wages for these 
kinds of work. But that is a heavy ask, to put a significant part of the social cost 
of serving under-served clients onto the backs of the lawyers themselves, 
particularly when they are also largely responsible for the investment in their 
human capital. One way to spread at least some of those costs more collectively 
is through IDR. By shifting some of the costs of legal education off of the 
lawyers serving the neediest clients and onto more financially successful lawyers 
(and, by extension, the clients they serve), IDR can lead to somewhat more 
disposable income for these lawyers, helping to ease some of the pressures of 
the cost disease on legal services.  
To be clear, IDR is not a full solution for dealing with the many problems 
of access to justice—far from it. But when we recall the deep connection 
between legal education and legal services, we can see IDR not just as a tool to 
benefit lawyers, but also as a tool to benefit the communities many lawyers serve. 
Viewed in this way, IDR is a way of pooling at least some of the costs of ensuring 
that everyone can navigate our increasingly legalized society and administrative 
state. 
D. The Promise and Problem of Public Service Loan 
Forgiveness 
The argument above—that subsidizing some of the costs of legal education 
can be a subsidy to expand legal services and access to justice—is also part of 
the argument behind Public Service Loan Forgiveness.72 PSLF stands somewhat 
apart from the more general IDR programs. IDR applies to all borrowers, while 
PSLF only applies to borrowers working in particular government or public 
interest jobs.73 Under general IDR, the borrower pays 10% of their discretionary 
income and then qualifies for loan forgiveness after 20-25 years (really only 
                                               
71 Michael Simkovic and Frank McIntyre have shown that over a career, lawyers still do 
quite well financially. Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree, 
43 J. LEGAL STUD. 249 (2014). They show that even lawyers in the 25th percentile of earnings 
over a career make an earnings premium over bachelor’s degree holders that likely covers at least 
the cost of their legal education. Id. at 260. But that would not necessarily hold if there were an 
expansion in the number of attorneys serving needier populations. Their wages would likely be 
lower than the current average, and the expansion of supply of lawyers could bring down wages 
for everyone.  
72 See, e.g., Philip G Schrag, Federal Student Loan Repayment Assistance for Public Interest Lawyers 
and Other Employees of Governments and Nonprofit Organizations, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 27 (2007). 
73 34 C.F.R. § 685.219(c)(1). 
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partial forgiveness under current law, because the forgiveness is taxable74). 
Under PSLF, the borrower still pays 10% of their discretionary income, but 
qualifies for forgiveness after 10 years (and the forgiveness is tax free).75 Thus, 
PSLF is substantially more generous than general IDR (particularly because 
years 11-20 of a lawyer’s career are likely to much higher earning than years 1-
10).  
Critics of IDR suggest that the program is far too generous, especially to 
lawyers and other professionals,76 but it is really the generosity of PSLF in 
particular that is the source of their concerns. In my view, the generosity of 
PSLF is not in and of itself a problem—it is quite reasonable for society as a 
whole to bear the bulk of the cost of developing the skills of a person working 
in the public interest.77 But the relative treatment of PSLF borrowers and all other 
borrowers based on a sharp bright line is less defensible. 
First, there is simply the issue of need. Income, as imperfect as it is, is our 
general metric of a person’s need and a person’s ability to pay. A lawyer working 
in the private sector making income of $X has the same need and the same ability 
to pay as a person working in the public sector making income of $X. In taxation, 
we look at notions like horizontal equity to determine tax fairness and justice. 
Our income tax says that by having the same income, these two individuals have 
the same ability to pay taxes. It is not obvious why that answer should be 
different for student loans. 
Second, if measurement of need cannot explain the different treatment, can 
we explain it in terms of programmatic goals? That is, can PSLF be defended as 
a decision to invest more substantial public resources into educating those who 
work in government or public interest careers compared to the private sector? 
Perhaps, but the particular choices of how to measure that subsidy are 
problematic. For one, the sharp line-drawing between what is a “public interest” 
job and what is not belies a more nuanced reality. As this article has argued, 
many attorneys in private practice also serve substantial public interests, and we 
have a public interest in having even more attorneys in private practice. 
Moreover, it is not clear why the ten-year mark is the point at which to measure 
the subsidy. If forgiveness were at year 20, and the borrower continued to be in 
a relatively low-paying job in years 11-20, the income-contingent payments and 
ultimate forgiveness would still be generous. But if a borrower ends up having 
a more lucrative later career, some of that value could be captured through 
higher payments in years 11-20. Finally, many people—not just lawyers—may 
                                               
74 See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. 
75 See supra notes 53 & 58 and accompanying text. 
76 See, e.g., Jason Delisle & Alexander Holt, New Am. Found., Safety Net Or Windfall?: 
Examining Changes To Income-Based Repayment For Federal Student Loans, at 10 (2012), 
https://www.newamerica.org/education-policy/policy-papers/safety-net-or-windfall.  
77 See Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment, supra note 4, at 264-67. 
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move between the private and public sector throughout their careers, and it is 
not obvious to me that requiring ten years of strict public service work (and/or 
the hassle of moving between different repayment programs) creates the right 
incentives. 
In part, these first two points collapse into one. The measurement both of 
a person’s need and of how much a person is sacrificing from their own earnings 
to contribute to the public good are both captured (albeit imperfectly) by the 
person’s income. Attempting to further differentiate requires the sort of line-
drawing that PSLF does. By its nature, that sort of line-drawing will be 
imperfect, and introduces massive differences in treatment based on formalistic 
distinctions. As of the first quarter of 2018, about one-third of all applications 
for PSLF had been denied, according to the Education Department.78 Even if 
some of those applications were shots in the dark, it is likely that a significant 
number of borrowers mistakenly believed that they qualified, or (worse) that the 
approval process is broken. Looking only at income provides a fairer and more 
objective measure than a bureaucracy (typically at a private loan servicing 
company) trying to apply a flawed definition of “public interest.”79 
Third, if we cannot differentiate the two based on need and programmatic 
goals, we have to look to more subjective notions like merit and desert—one of 
these lawyers simply deserves a more generous transfer because of the 
meritorious choice to work in the public interest (even if we could define that 
well). I think the moral weakness of this position speaks for itself, particularly 
because the underlying structure of the student loan program means that these 
benefits go disproportionately to those with graduate and professional degrees, 
rather than the many others who also work in the public interest.80 
Finally, and more practically, the gulf between the treatment of PSLF and 
other IDR borrowers opens up the broader IDR program to political attack,81 
and the cost of PSLF limits the ability to expand IDR into other areas. I have 
                                               
78 Federal Student Aid, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. Public Service Loan Forgiveness Employment 
Certification Forms Report, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/student/portfolio.  
79 See Ron Lieber, A Student Loan Nightmare: The Teacher in the Wrong Payment Plan, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 27, 2017), available at: https://nyti.ms/2yRpsyN.  
80 Recall that the limits of the underlying federal Direct Loans mean that IDR benefits for 
those with only undergraduate loans are also limited. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying 
text. Thus a person with only an undergraduate degree working in the public interest implicitly 
is asked to pay more of the cost of her education that a similar person with a graduate or 
professional degree.  
81 See, e.g., DELISLE & HOLT, supra note 76; John R. Brooks, Don’t Let the GOP Dismantle 
Obama’s Student Loan Reforms, N.Y. TIMES (April 9, 2018), available at: 
https://nyti.ms/2GI9WMQ; Jason Delisle, The Coming Public Service Loan Forgiveness Bonanza, 
Brookings Institution Evidence Speaks Report (Sept. 22, 2016), available at: 
http://brook.gs/2cpk5yW.  
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argued elsewhere both for expanding the amount of IDR-eligible debt that is 
available to undergraduates82 and for excluding the forgiven debt from gross 
income for tax purposes.83 Both would likely have some fiscal cost, and 
reforming PSLF is a compelling way to offset those costs. Reform of PSLF 
could also allow more targeted benefits to the neediest borrowers in general 
IDR, such as using a graduated repayment rate structure instead of the current 
flat 10% rate. While a full consideration of possible reforms to PSLF and IDR 
is beyond the scope of this article, unpacking the economic, policy, and moral 
arguments undergirding IDR will be a necessary part of that project. 
VI. Conclusion 
Legal education and legal services are, by their very nature, expensive, and 
those high costs pose a deep threat to justice. Our increasingly complex, 
regulatory, and legalized world requires the mediation of professionals trained 
to navigate complicated legal and regulatory systems, but the high cost of 
training and retaining lawyers means that many individuals and households go 
without, and the systems intended to ensure broad welfare and shared prosperity 
go unattended. The cost disease has a very real effect not just on economic 
justice, but on civil and legal justice as well.  
Addressing these issues will require multiple solutions, but we should 
recognize that we already have in place a tool that could effectively provide 
progressive, public funding of legal education—a tool to help cure the cost 
disease. Income-Driven Repayment, by tying student loan payments to income 
and forgiving loans after a period of time, helps to ensure that legal education is 
affordable to anyone, regardless of their ultimate practice area or even career. 
And that, in turn, can mean more lawyers working in the public interest and 
serving moderate-income households. Income-contingent loans are not, and 
cannot be, the only solution, but any broader reform must consider their already 
central role in financing legal education and legal services. 
                                               
82 Brooks, Case for More Debt, supra note 4. 
83 Brooks, Student Loan Discharge, supra note 58. 
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